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Recent developments in the Japanese economy are characterized by the
concurrence of two rare phenomena: deﬂation and zero nominal interest
rates. The year-on-year Consumer Price Index (CPI) inﬂation rate has been
below zero for about six years since the second quarter of 1998 (see ﬁgure
6.1). On the other hand, the uncollateralized overnight call rate has been
practically zero since the Bank of Japan (BOJ) policy board made a decision
on February 12, 1999, to lower it to be “as low as possible” (see ﬁgure 6.2).
The concurrence of these two phenomena has revived the interest of re-
searchers in what Keynes (1936) called a liquidity trap, and various studies
have recently investigated this issue. These studies share the following two
features. First, regarding diagnosis, they argue that the natural rate of in-
terest, which is deﬁned as the equilibrium real interest rate, is below zero in
Japan, while the real overnight call rate is above zero because of deﬂation-
ary expectations, and that such an interest rate gap leads to weak aggregate
demand. This diagnosis was ﬁrst made by Krugman (1998) and is shared by
Woodford (1999); Reifschneider and Williams (2000); Jung, Teranishi, and
Watanabe (2003); and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a, b), among others.1
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1. Rogoﬀ (1998) casts doubt on the plausibility of this diagnosis by pointing out that the
investment-GDP ratio is well over 20 percent in Japan. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and UribeSecond, based on this diagnosis, these studies write out a prescription
that the BOJ should make a commitment to an expansionary monetary pol-
icy in the future. Woodford (1999) and Reifschneider and Williams (2000)
argue that, even when the current overnight interest rate is close to zero, the
long-term nominal interest rate could be well above zero if future overnight
rates are expected to be above zero.2 In this situation, a central bank could
lower the long-term nominal interest rate by committing itself to an ex-
pansionary monetary policy in the future, thereby stimulating current ag-
gregate demand. As emphasized by Woodford (1999); Jung, Teranishi, and
Watanabe (2003); and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a, b), an important
feature of this prescription is monetary-policy inertia: a zero interest rate
policy should be continued for a while, even after the natural rate of inter-
est returns to a positive level. By making such a commitment, a central
bank is able to achieve lower long-term nominal interest rates, higher ex-
pected inﬂation, and a weaker domestic currency in the adverse periods
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(2002) show the existence of a self-fulﬁlling deﬂationary equilibrium, in which deﬂation and
zero interest rates simultaneously occur even if the natural rate of interest stays above zero.
Christiano (2004) investigates the numerical conditions under which the natural rate of inter-
est falls temporarily below zero, using a model with endogenous capital formation.
2. Note that this argument assumes that an adverse shock to the natural rate of interest is
not permanent but temporary. Otherwise, future overnight rates are also constrained by the
zero lower bound, so that there is no room for lowering the long-term nominal interest rate.
Svensson (2001) names this a temporary liquidity trap to emphasize the diﬀerence from the
original deﬁnition by Keynes (1936) in which the long-term nominal interest rate faces the
zero bound constraint.
Fig. 6.1 CPI inﬂation
Source: “Consumer Price Index,” The Ministry of Public Management, Home Aﬀairs, Posts,
and Telecommunicationswhen the natural rate of interest signiﬁcantly deviates from a normal level.
This is as if a central bank “borrows” future monetary easing in the peri-
ods when current monetary easing is exhausted.
This idea of borrowing future easing has been discussed not only in the
academic arena, but also in the policymaking process.3 Just after the intro-
duction of a “zero interest rate policy” in February 1999, there was a per-
ception in the money markets that such an irregular policy would not be
continued for long. Reﬂecting this perception, implied forward interest
rates for longer than six months started to rise in early March. This was
clearly against the BOJ’s expectation that the zero overnight call rate would
spread to longer-term nominal interest rates. Forced to make the bank’s
policy intention clearer, Governor Masaru Hayami announced on April
13, 1999, that the monetary-policy board would keep the overnight inter-
est rate at zero until “deﬂationary concerns are dispelled.”4 Some re-
searchers and practitioners argue that this announcement has had the
eﬀect of lowering longer-term interest rates by altering the market’s expec-
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Fig. 6.2 Uncollateralized overnight call rates
Source: Bank of Japan
3. For example, Governor Toshihiko Fukui stated no June 1, 2003, that the idea behind the
current policy commitment is “to achieve an easing eﬀect by the Bank’s commitment to keep
short-term rates at low levels well into the future. In this way, even if short-term rates come up
against the lower bound, the Bank can still “borrow” from the eﬀect of the future low rates”
(Fukui 2003).
4. The BOJ terminated this commitment in August 2000, and made a new commitment of
maintaining quantitative-easing policy until “the core CPI registers stably a zero percent or
an increase year on year” in March 2001. See table 6.1 for the chronology of the BOJ’s mon-
etary policy decisions in 1999–2004.tations about the future path of the overnight call rate (Taylor 2000). Given
such a similarity between the BOJ’s policy intention and the prescriptions
proposed by academic researchers, a natural question is whether or not the
BOJ’s policy commitment is close to the optimal one. The ﬁrst objective of
this chapter is to measure the distance between the optimal monetary-
policy rule derived in the literature and the BOJ’s policy in practice.
The second objective of this chapter is to think about the role of ﬁscal
policy in a liquidity trap. The typical textbook answer to the question of
how to escape from a liquidity trap is to adopt an expansionary ﬁscal pol-
icy, given that monetary policy is ineﬀective in the sense of no more room
for current interest rate reductions (Hicks 1967). Interestingly, however, re-
searchers since Krugman (1998) pay almost no attention to the role of ﬁs-
cal policy. This diﬀerence comes from their assumption about the behavior
of the government: the government adjusts its primary surplus so that the
government intertemporal budget constraint is satisﬁed for any possible
path of the price level. That is, ﬁscal policy is assumed to be “passive” in
the sense of Leeper (1991) or “Ricardian” in the terminology of Woodford
(1995). Given this assumption, the government budget constraint is auto-
matically satisﬁed, so that researchers need not worry about the govern-
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Table 6.1 Chronology of monetary policy decisions in 1999–2004
Date Event
09/09/98 The BOJ reduces the target O/N rate to 0.25 from 0.50 percent.
02/12/99 The BOJ introduces a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP).
04/13/99 Governor Hayami announces the BOJ will continue the ZIRP until
“deﬂationary concerns are dispelled.”
10/13/99 The BOJ expands the range of money market operations.
08/11/00 The BOJ terminates the ZIRP.
The target O/N rate is set at 0.25 percent.
02/09/01 The BOJ introduces “Lombard-type” lending facility and reduces the ofﬁcial
discount rate to 0.375 from 0.5 percent.
02/28/01 The BOJ reduces the target O/N rate to 0.125 percent and the ofﬁcial discount
rate to 0.25 percent.
03/19/01 The BOJ announces to introduce “quantitative monetary easing policy” and
continue it until “the core CPI records a year-on-year increase of zero percent
or more on a stable basis.”
08/14/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 6 trillion yen.
09/18/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to above 6 trillion yen.
12/19/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 10–15 trillion yen.
10/30/02 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 15–20 trillion yen.
04/01/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 17–22 trillion yen.
04/30/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 22–27 trillion yen.
05/20/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 27–30 trillion yen.
10/10/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 27–32 trillion yen.
The BOJ announces more detailed description of its commitment regarding
the timing to terminate “quantitative easing policy.”
01/20/04 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 30–35 trillion yen.ment’s solvency condition in characterizing the optimal monetary-policy
rule in a liquidity trap.5 However, this does not necessarily imply that ﬁscal
policy plays no role in the determination of equilibrium inﬂation. Rather,
as pointed out by Iwamura and Watanabe (2002) and Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003b), a path for the primary surplus is uniquely selected when
one chooses a monetary-policy path by solving a central bank’s loss-
minimization problem. Put diﬀerently, even if a central bank faithfully
follows the optimal monetary-policy rule derived in the literature, the
economy might fail to achieve the optimal outcome if the government’s
behavior deviates from the one compatible with the optimal monetary-
policy rule. Then one might ask whether or not the assumption of passive
ﬁscal policy was actually satisﬁed during the period in which the Japanese
economy was in a liquidity trap. Speciﬁcally, one might be interested in
whether or not the Japanese government has adjusted the primary balance
as implicitly assumed in the literature.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 characterizes
optimal policies in a liquidity trap with a special emphasis on the optimal
ﬁscal-policy rule. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 compare the optimal commitment
solution with the monetary and ﬁscal policy adopted in 1999–2004. Sec-
tion 6.5 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Optimal Commitment Policy in a Liquidity Trap
6.2.1 A Simple Model
Household’s Consumption Decision
Let us consider a representative household that seeks to maximize a dis-




 tu(ct   gt) ,
where u( ) is an increasing and concave function with respect to ct gt, and
  represents the discount factor. Following Woodford (2001), we assume
that the private consumption expenditures ct and the government pur-
chases gtare perfectly substitutable, so that government purchases have ex-
actly the same eﬀect on the economy as transfers to households of funds
suﬃcient to ﬁnance private consumption for exactly the same amount.
This assumption, together with the assumption of lump-sum taxes, creates
a simple environment in which the government behavior aﬀects the equi-
librium only through changes in the household’s budget constraint. Also,
we do not treat money balances and labor supply explicitly in the utility
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5. With respect to this, Krugman states, “We assume . . . that any implications of the [open
market] operation for the government’s budget constraint are taken care of via lump-sum
taxes and transfers” (Krugman 2000, 225).function in order to make the exposition simpler (see Woodford [2003] for
detailed discussions on these issues).
The representative household is subject to a ﬂow budget constraint of
the form




t,t j   Bh
t 1,t j]   P tdt   Bh
t 1,t,
where P tis the price level, dtis the household’s disposable income, and Qt,t j
is a (nominal) stochastic discount factor for pricing arbitrary ﬁnancial
claims that matures in period t   j.6 We assume that the government issues
zero-coupon nominal bonds, each of which pays one yen when it matures,
and denote the face value of bonds held by the representative household at
the end of period t that will come due in period t   j by Bh
t,t j. Since the
nominal market price in period t of a bond that matures in period t   j
is Et[Qt,t j] (  Et[1   Qt,t j]), the second term on the right-hand side rep-
resents the amount of repayment for bonds that mature in period t. The
representative household allocates the sum of disposable income and the
repayment between consumption expenditures and the purchases of gov-
ernment bonds. The term Bh
t,t j– Bh
t–1,t jrepresents the change from the pre-
vious period in the face value of bonds that mature in period t   j, namely,
an amount of net purchase in period t. These new bonds are evaluated at
the market price in period t. Note that nominal bond prices must satisfy
Et[Qt,t j]   Et[Qt,t 1Qt 1,t 2   ...     Qt j 1,t j],
and that the one-period risk-free nominal interest rate in period t   k (k  
0), which is denoted by it k, satisﬁes
  Et k[Qt k,t k 1].
Under the assumption that the central bank can control the one-period
risk-free interest rate, these two equations imply that the market’s expecta-
tions about the future course of monetary policy, represented by the path
of it k, aﬀects nominal bond prices.
The sequence of ﬂow budget constraints and the No-Ponzi-game condi-
tion implies an intertemporal budget constraint, and necessary and suﬃ-
cient conditions for household maximization are then that the ﬁrst-order
condition
(2.2) 1   it     1 Et      
 1 P t  
P t 1
u (ct 1   gt 1)
  
u (ct   gt)
1
 
1   it k
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6. Under the assumption of complete ﬁnancial markets, the existence and uniqueness of
such an asset-pricing kernel follows from the absence of arbitrage opportunities.holds at all times, and that the household exhausts its intertemporal bud-
get constraint. We assume that some part, denoted by vt, of the economy’s
output yt is distributed to another type of household that does not make
consumption decisions based on intertemporal utility maximization, so
that the market-clearing condition can be written as yt   ct   vt   gt. Sub-
stituting this condition into equation (2.2) yields
(2.3) 1   it     1 Et      
 1
.
Substituting the same condition into the ﬂow budget constraint (equation
[2.1] with an exact equality) and the corresponding intertemporal budget
constraint leads to
(2.4) P tst  ∑
 
j 1




Et[Qt,t jP t jst j]  ∑
 
j 0
Et[Qt,t j]Bt 1,t j
where st represents the real primary surplus, which is deﬁned as tax rev-
enues less government expenditures, and Bt,t j is the supply of government
bonds.7
We log-linearize equations (2.3) and (2.4) around the baseline path of
each variable, which is speciﬁed as follows. With respect to the maturity
structure of government debt, we assume
(2.6)    j   1f or j   1, 2, . . . ,
where   is a parameter satisfying 0    1. We use ∗ to indicate the base-
line path of a variable. The term B∗
t–1,t j represents the face value of bonds
at the end of period t– 1 that mature in period t j, and B∗
t j–1,t jrepresents
the face value of the same type of bonds just before redemption in period 
t   j. Equation (2.6) simply states that the government issues additional
bonds, which mature in period t j, at a rate  in each period between tand
t j– 1. Note that   0 corresponds to the case in which all bonds mature
in one period, while   1 corresponds to the case in which all bonds are
perpetual bonds. With respect to other variables, we assume
ct ∗   c∗; yt ∗   y∗; st ∗   s∗; Pt ∗   P∗; Q∗
t,t j    j; vt ∗   0.
Note that the inﬂation rate is assumed to be zero on the baseline path.
Log-linearizing equation (2.3) around the baseline path, we obtain
(2.7) x ˆt   Etx ˆt 1     1[(ı ˆt   Et  ˆt 1)   r ˆ t
n],
B∗
t 1,t j  
B∗
t j 1,t j
P t  
P t 1
u (yt 1   vt 1)
  
u (yt   vt)
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7. Here we implicitly assume that the second type of household faces a ﬂow budget con-
straint similar to equation (2.1), and that they exhaust their budget constraint.where a variable with a hat represents the proportional deviation of the
variable from its value on the baseline path (for example, z ˆt is deﬁned as 
z ˆt   ln zt – ln zt ∗),8 and   is a positive parameter deﬁned as     –u (y∗)y∗/
u (y∗). The output gap xt is deﬁned as xt   yt – yt
n, where yt
n represents the
natural rate of output or potential output. The inﬂation rate  t is deﬁned
as  t ln P t– ln P t–1. Finally, the deviation of the natural rate of interest from
its baseline path, r ˆt
n, is deﬁned as
(2.8) r ˆ t
n    Et[(y ˆ n
t 1   y ˆ t
n)   (v ˆt 1   v ˆt)].
According to the above deﬁnition of r ˆ t
n, variations in the natural rate of in-
terest are caused by short-term factors such as changes in vt, as well as long-
term factors such as the growth rate of potential output. Log-linearizing
equation (2.4) around the baseline path, we obtain9
(2.9) (1     )[B ˆ
t    1B ˆ
t 1]   (1     )(1    )(  ) 1Q ˆ
t    1(1    )[P ˆ
t s ˆt]
where B ˆ
t and Q ˆ





(  )jB ˆ




(  )jEt[Q ˆ
t,t j].
B ˆ
t and Q ˆ
t can be interpreted as a nominal debt aggregate, and an index of
nominal bond prices.
Equation (2.7) can be seen as an “IS equation” that states that the out-
put gap in period t is determined by the expected value of the output gap
in period t   1 and the gap between the short-term real interest rate and
the natural rate of interest in period t. Equation (2.7) can be iterated for-
ward to obtain
(2.10) x ˆt       1∑
 
j 0
Et[(ı ˆt j    ˆt j 1)   r ˆ n
t j].
According to the expectations theory, the expression Σ 
j 0 Et[(ı ˆt j –   ˆt j 1) –
r ˆ n
t j] stands for the deviation of the long-term real interest rate from the cor-
responding natural rate of interest in period t, which implies that, given the
path of the natural rate of interest, the output gap depends inversely on the
long-term real interest rate.
New Keynesian Phillips Curve
In addition to the IS equation, we need an “AS equation” to describe the
supply side of the economy. We adopt a framework of staggered price set-
ting developed by Calvo (1983). It is assumed that in each period a fraction
240 Mitsuru Iwamura, Takeshi Kudo, and Tsutomu Watanabe
8. The deﬁnition of ı ˆt diﬀers slightly from those of the other variables; namely, ı ˆt   ln(1  
it) – ln(1   it ∗).
9. The household’s intertemporal budget constraint and the market-clearing condition im-
ply that BI
t–1,t/Pt ∗   (1 –   )(1 –  )–1st ∗ holds on the baseline path. We use this to obtain equa-
tion (2.9).1 –   of goods suppliers get to set a new price, while the remaining   must
continue to sell at their previously posted prices. The suppliers that get to
set new prices are chosen randomly each period, with each having an equal
probability of being chosen. Under these assumptions, we obtain an AS
equation of the form10
(2.11)   ˆt    x ˆt    Et  ˆt 1,
where   is a positive parameter which is conversely related to the value of
 . Equation (2.11) is the so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve, which
diﬀers from the traditional Phillips curve in that current inﬂation depends
on the expected rate of future inﬂation, Et  ˆt 1, rather than the expected
rate of current inﬂation, Et–1  ˆt.
Locally Ricardian Fiscal Policy
We assume that the government determines the (nominal) primary sur-
plus each period following a ﬁscal-policy rule of the form
(2.12) P tst  ∑
 
j 0
[Et(Qt,t j)   Et 1(Qt 1,t j)]Bt 1,t j,
where the term Et(Qt,t j) – Et–1(Qt–1,t j) represents the realized nominal one-
period holding return, including interest payments and capital gains/
losses, for a bond that matures in period t j. Equation (2.12) simply states
that the government creates a primary surplus by an amount just enough
to cover these payments on existing liabilities. In a deterministic environ-
ment, in which there is no uncertainty about the sequence of bond prices,
the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies it–1  (Qt,t j– Qt–1,t j)/Qt–1,t j,
so that equation (2.12) reduces to
(2.13) P tst   it 1 ∑
 
j 0
Qt 1,t jBt 1,t j ,
where the term Σ 
j 0Qt–1,t jBt–1,t jrepresents the market value of the existing
government liabilities at the end of period t – 1, and the right-hand side of
equation (2.13) represents the interest payments on existing liabilities.
Equation (2.13) is equivalent to a budget-deﬁcit (not primary deﬁcit but
conventional deﬁcit) targeting rule, and in that sense, is very close to the
spirit of the ﬁscal requirement of the Maastricht treaty or the Stability and
Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union. Also, the ﬁscal-policy rule
of this form is used in empirical studies such as Bohn (1998), in order to de-
scribe the actual government’s behavior.
Substituting equation (2.12) into the government’s ﬂow budget con-
straint (equation [2.4]), we observe that
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10. See Woodford (2003) for more on the derivation.∑
 
j 0
Et[Qt,t 1 j]Bt,t 1 j  ∑
 
j 0
Et 1[Qt 1,t j]Bt 1,t j
holds each period. That is, the market value of the existing government li-
abilities does not change in each period as long as the government deter-





Q  1,  jB  1,  j]   Et[Qt,  1] ∑
 
j 0
Et 1[Qt 1,t j]Bt 1,t j
holds for all   t, which implies11
(2.14) lim




Q  1,  jB  1,  j]   0.
This equation states that the ﬁscal-policy rule (2.12) guarantees the trans-
versality condition for any path of the price level. Thus the government’s
transversality condition does not aﬀect the price level in equilibrium as
long as the government follows the rule (2.12). Fiscal-policy rules with this
feature are called “passive” by Leeper (1991), and “locally Ricardian” by
Woodford (1995).
Equations (2.7), (2.9), (2.11), and the log-linear version of (2.12)
(2.15) s ˆt   P ˆ
t   (1      )B ˆ
t 1   (1    ) 1(1      )[Q ˆ
t     1Q ˆ
t 1]
consist of four key equations of our model.12 Given the natural rate of in-
terest r ˆ t
n as an exogenous variable and the short-term nominal interest rate
ı ˆt as a policy variable, which is determined as we see in the next subsection,
these four equations determine the equilibrium paths of x ˆ, P ˆ (or equiva-
lently   ˆ), B ˆ, and s ˆ.13It should be emphasized that ﬁscal variables (s ˆtand B ˆ
t)
do not appear in the IS and AS equations ([2.7] and [2.11]), so that, given
the paths of ı ˆt and r ˆ t
n, these two equations determine the paths of x ˆt and   ˆt
(or equivalently P ˆ
t), independently of the ﬁscal variables. In this sense,
equations (2.7) and (2.11) constitute an independent block in the four-
equations system; namely, they ﬁrst determine the paths of x ˆt and   ˆt, and,
given them, the other two equations determine the paths of the two ﬁscal
variables (s ˆt and B ˆ
t). This structure of the model is fully utilized when we
characterize the optimal monetary-policy rule in the next subsection.
242 Mitsuru Iwamura, Takeshi Kudo, and Tsutomu Watanabe
11. Here we assume that the short-term nominal interest rate might be zero in the present
and subsequent periods, but that it is strictly above zero in the suﬃciently remote future, so
that lim →  Et(Qt,  1)   0.
12. Note that equation (2.5), which is an equilibrium condition related to government sol-
vency, is not a part of the key equations, since it is automatically satisﬁed as long as the gov-
ernment follows the rule (2.12).
13. Since Q ˆ
t –ı ˆt– Σ 
j 1(  ) jEt(ı ˆt 1  ı ˆt 2  ...    ı ˆt j–1), the value of Q ˆ
t is determined by the
path of the short-term nominal interest rate chosen by the central bank. Note that the expec-
tations theory holds locally (i.e., as long as deviations of each variable from its baseline value
are small enough).6.2.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
Adverse Shock to the Economy
Following Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2003), we consider a situa-
tion in which the economy is hit by a large-scale negative-demand shock;
the central bank responds to it by lowering the short-term nominal inter-
est rate to zero; but aggregate demand is still insuﬃcient to close the out-
put gap. More speciﬁcally, we assume that a large negative shock to the nat-
ural rate of interest, denoted by ε0
n, occurs in period zero, so that the
natural rate of interest takes a large negative value in period zero and sub-
sequent periods. The deviation of the natural rate of interest from the base-
line path is described by
(2.16) r ˆ t
n   ln(1   rt
n)   ln(1   rt
n∗)    te0
n for t   0, . . . ,
where r t
n∗ is the baseline value of the natural rate of interest, which is as-
sumed to be equal to  –1(1 –  ), and   is a parameter satisfying 0    1.14
It is important to note that the natural rate of interest r ˆt
n appears only in
the IS equation (2.7), and that ﬂuctuations in the natural rate of interest
could be completely oﬀset if the central bank equalizes the short-term
nominal interest rate to the natural rate of interest (ı ˆt r ˆt
n). In the usual sit-
uation, therefore, aggregate-demand shocks can be completely oﬀset by an
appropriate monetary policy. However, this is not true if the natural rate of
interest falls below zero and the nonnegativity constraint of the short-term
nominal interest rate, it   0, or its log-linear version
(2.17) ı ˆt     1(1    )   0
is binding.
Optimization Under Discretion
The central bank chooses the path of the short-term nominal interest




 t(  ˆt
2    x ˆ t
2),
subject to equations (2.7), (2.9), (2.11), (2.15), and (2.17). Since equations
(2.7) and (2.11) consist of an independent block, and the ﬁscal variables (s ˆt
and B ˆ
t) do not appear in the loss function, the optimization problem can be
solved in a step-by-step manner: we ﬁrst minimize the loss-function subject
to equations (2.7), (2.11), and (2.17) and characterize the optimal paths for
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14. Here we assume that, following Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2003), the stock to the
natural rate of interest is known in period zero and that no new information arrives in the sub-
sequent periods. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a, b) extend the analysis by introducing sto-
chastic disturbances of some special form. It is important to note that certainty equivalence
does not hold in our optimization problem because of the nonnegativity constraint on nom-
inal interest rates, so that the diﬀerence between a deterministic and a stochastic environment
is not trivial.ı ˆt, x ˆt, and   ˆt; then we substitute them into equations (2.9) and (2.15) to ob-
tain the optimal paths for s ˆt and B ˆ
t.
Under the assumption of discretionary monetary policy, the central
bank reoptimizes in each period. The optimization problem is represented




 t{Lt 2 1t[x ˆt x ˆt 1    1(ı ˆt   ˆt 1 r ˆt
n)]  2 2t[  ˆt  x ˆt    ˆt 1]},
where  1t and  2t represent the Lagrange multipliers associated with the IS
and AS equations. We diﬀerentiate the Lagrangian with respect to   ˆt, x ˆt,
and ı ˆt to obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions
(2.18)   ˆt    2t   0
(2.19)  x ˆt    1t      2t   0
(2.20) [ı ˆt     1(1    )]  1t   0
(2.21) ı ˆt     1(1    )   0
(2.22)  1t   0.
Equations (2.20), (2.21), and (2.22) are Kuhn-Tucker conditions regard-
ing the nonnegativity constraint on the nominal interest rate. Observe that
∂ /∂ı ˆt   2 –1 t 1t ∝  1t. If the nonnegativity constraint is not binding, 
∂ /∂ı ˆtis equal to zero, so that  1tis also zero. On the other hand, if the con-
straint is binding, ∂ /∂ı ˆt is nonnegative, and so is  1t.
Given the assumption that the natural rate of interest converges monot-
onically to its baseline value (see equation [2.16]), it is straightforward to
guess that the non-negativity constraint is binding until some period, de-
noted by period Td, but is not binding afterwards. By eliminating  2t from
equations (2.18) and (2.19), we obtain
 1t      [  ˆt     1 x ˆt].
Substituting  1t   0 into this equation leads to  x ˆt      ˆt   0, which, to-
gether with the AS equation, imply   ˆt   0, x ˆt   0, and
(2.23) ı ˆt   r ˆt
n
for t   Td   1, ....  T hus the central bank sets the short-term nominal in-
terest rate at zero during the periods in which the natural rate of interest is
below zero, but, once the natural rate returns to a positive level, the central
bank equalizes it with the level of the natural rate of interest. In this sense,
the timing to terminate a zero interest rate policy is determined entirely by
an exogenous factor, r ˆ t
n.
Optimization Under Commitment
We now proceed to the commitment solution: the central bank makes a
commitment about the current and future path of the short-term nominal
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private sector’s expectations. The ﬁrst-order conditions become
(2.24)   ˆt   (  ) 1 1t 1    2t    2t 1   0
(2.25)  x ˆt    1t     1 1t 1      2t   0
(2.26) [ı ˆt     1(1    )]  1t   0
(2.27) ı ˆt     1(1    )   0
(2.28)  1t   0,
which diﬀer from those obtained earlier in that lagged Lagrange multipli-
ers,  1t–1 and  2t–1, appear in the ﬁrst two equations. We eliminate  2t from
equations (2.24) and (2.25) to obtain a second-order diﬀerence equation
with respect to  1t.
 1t   [1     1    (  ) 1] 1t 1     1 1t 2     [  ˆt     1 (x ˆt   x ˆt 1)] 
for t   0, . . . , Tc   1,
where Tc is the ﬁnal period of a zero interest rate policy, and initial condi-
tions are given by  1–1   1–2 0. A unique solution to this diﬀerence equa-
tion is given by
(2.30)  1t     A(L)[  ˆt     1 (x ˆt   x ˆt 1)],
where L is a lag-operator and A(L) is deﬁned by
A(L)        ,
and  1 and  2 are the two real solutions to the characteristic equation asso-
ciated with the diﬀerence equation (2.29), satisfying  1   1 and 0    2   1.
Equation (2.29) has the following implications regarding the diﬀerences
between the discretionary and commitment solutions. First, as pointed out
by Woodford (1999) and Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2003), a zero in-
terest rate policy is continued longer in the case of commitment. To see this,
we observe from equations (2.10), (2.11), and (2.30) that
 1t   B(L)[(ı ˆt    ˆt 1)   r ˆt
n],
where
B(L)      1A(L)[ (1    L 1) 1(1   L 1) 1     1 (1   L 1) 1(1   L)].
Note that the real interest rate will never be below the natural rate of inter-
est ([ı ˆt –   ˆt 1] – r ˆ t
n   0) in the case of discretion. Thus, if a zero interest rate
policy is terminated in period Td,  1t takes a positive value at t   Td   1,
indicating that
0   Td   Tc    .
 2  
1    2L
 1  
1    1L
1
 
 1    2
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Liquidity Trap 245The optimal commitment solution is characterized by monetary-policy in-
ertia, in the sense that a zero interest rate policy is continued for a while
even after the natural rate of interest becomes positive. This is in sharp con-
trast with the case of discretion, in which a zero interest rate policy is ter-
minated as soon as the natural rate of interest becomes positive.
Second, we compare ﬁscal adjustments between the discretionary and
commitment solutions. By log-linearizing the government’s intertemporal
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In either discretionary or commitment solutions, the short-term nominal
interest rate is set at zero for some periods and then returns to a normal
level, which means that E0(Q ˆ
0,t) takes positive values in period zero and
subsequent periods and then returns to zero. Given that     [0, 1], this im-
plies that the second term on the right-hand side is nonpositive, therefore
the (nominal) primary surplus must be on or below its baseline path.15Fur-
thermore, the degree of ﬁscal expansion depends on the maturity structure
of government bonds: the shorter the maturity, the larger the ﬁscal expan-
sion. When the maturity of bonds is very long, reductions in the short-term
nominal interest rate in the current and future periods raise bond prices
signiﬁcantly, therefore fewer ﬁscal adjustments are needed.16
To compare the discretionary and commitment solutions in terms of real












c   P ˆ
t
d] 
  (1    ) 1  (1      ) ∑
 
t 0
(  )tE0(Q ˆ c
0,t)   (1    ) ∑
 
t 0
 tE0(Q ˆ c
0,t) 
  (1      ) ∑
 
t 0
(  )tE0(Q ˆ d
0,t)   (1    ) ∑
 
t 0
 tE0(Q ˆ d
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15. Note that, given the assumption that the economy is on the baseline before the natural
rate of interest falls in period zero, B ˆ
–1 in equation (2.31) must be zero.
16. For example, in the case of   0, in which all bonds are one-period bonds, reductions
in the short-term nominal interest rate in the current and future periods have no inﬂuence on
the current bond price, so that the ﬁrst term in the squared bracket [(1 –   )Σ 
t 0(  )tE0(Q ˆ
0,t)]
is zero, and the expression in the squared bracket takes a large negative value. On the other
hand, if all bonds are perpetual bonds (  1), the expression in the squared bracket equals





d in every period, and the second term is also negative because Td  
Tc implies E0(Q ˆ c
0,t)   E0(Q ˆ d










This indicates that the commitment solution cannot be achieved by mone-
tary policy alone, and that a close coordination with ﬁscal policy is indis-
pensable.17 A more expansionary stance should be taken on the side of ﬁs-
cal policy, as well as on the side of monetary policy.
6.2.3 Numerical Examples
In this subsection we numerically compute the optimal path of various
variables.18 Figure 6.3 shows the responses of eight variables to an adverse
shock to the natural rate of interest in the case of discretion. The paths for
the short-term nominal and real interest rates and the natural rate of in-
terest represent the level of those variables (it, it –  t 1, and rt
n), while those
of other variables are shown by the deviations from their baseline values.
The natural rate of interest, which is shown in panel G, stays below zero for
the ﬁrst four periods until period three, and becomes positive in period
four, then gradually goes back to a baseline level. In response to this shock,
the short-term nominal interest rate is set at zero for the ﬁrst four periods,
but becomes positive as soon as the natural rate of interest turns positive in
period four. Given the shock to the natural rate of interest and the mone-
tary-policy response to it, the short-term real interest rate rises and the
spread between it –  t 1 and rt
n is widened, as shown in panel G. Conse-
quently, inﬂation and the output gap stay below the baseline for the ﬁrst
four periods during which a zero interest rate policy is adopted, and return
to zero as soon as that policy is terminated.
Panels B, D, F, and H of ﬁgure 6.3 show the ﬁscal aspects of the model.
The price level falls during the ﬁrst four periods and continues to stay at a
level below the baseline, while the bond price rises in period zero and sub-
sequent periods reﬂecting the market expectation of monetary easing in
the current and future periods. This leads to a rise in the real value of the
existing public debt, which puts the government under pressure to increase
the real primary surplus, while lower interest payments due to the zero in-
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17. See Iwamura and Watanabe (2002) for a similar argument in a setting of perfectly ﬂex-
ible prices.
18. The values for structural parameters are borrowed from Woodford (1999):   0.048/
42;   0.99;   0.157;   0.024. We assume that   0.8. The initial shock to the natural
rate of interest, εn
0 in equation (2.16), is equal to –0.10, which means a 40 percent decline in
the annualized natural rate of interest. The persistence of the stock, which is represented by  
in equation (2.16) is 0.5 per quarter. The parameter values are all adjusted so that the length
of a period in our model is interpreted as a quarter.terest rate policy create room for the government to reduce the real pri-
mary surplus. Combining these two conﬂicting eﬀects, the real primary
surplus is below the baseline for the ﬁrst eight periods until period seven,
but slightly above the baseline path thereafter.
Figure 6.4 shows the responses of the same set of variables for the case
of commitment. An important diﬀerence from the discretionary solution
is that a zero interest rate policy is continued longer. Reﬂecting this, the cu-
248 Mitsuru Iwamura, Takeshi Kudo, and Tsutomu Watanabe







BFig. 6.4 Optimal responses under commitment
mulative sum of the deviation of the short-term real interest rate from the
natural rate of interest becomes signiﬁcantly smaller in comparison with
the case of discretion, leading to a decline in the real long-term interest rate.
This alleviates deﬂationary pressures on the inﬂation rate and the output
gap. Turning to the ﬁscal aspects of the model, monetary-policy inertia
(i.e., prolonging a zero interest rate policy) keeps the price level higher than
the baseline path, which is in sharp contrast with the case of discretion. As
a result, the real primary surplus stays below the baseline path even after




G HFig. 6.5 Diﬀerences between the commitment and discretionary solutions
the zero interest rate policy is terminated. The diﬀerences between the
commitment and discretionary solutions (the commitment solution minus
the discretionary solution) are shown in ﬁgure 6.5.
Table 6.2 shows the amounts of ﬁscal adjustments needed to achieve the
optimal outcomes under discretion and commitment. Nominal adjust-
ments (Σ 
t 1   j[P ˆ
t   s ˆt]) are negative in both solutions, indicating that ﬁscal
expansion is needed to achieve the optimal outcomes. Note that the
amount of ﬁscal adjustments is larger in the commitment solution in which
a zero interest rate policy is continued longer. Also, note that the amount
of ﬁscal adjustment depends on the maturity structure of government debt:




G Hthe amount of ﬁscal adjustment is larger when the maturity is shorter.
Turning to the real adjustments (Σ 
t 1  js ˆt), they are positive in the discre-
tionary solution while negative in the commitment solution. This reﬂects a
diﬀerence between the two solutions in terms of the path of the price level.
In the case of the discretionary solution, the price level is lower than on the
baseline (ﬁgure 6.3), so that a larger primary surplus is needed to ﬁnance
larger real redemption. On the other hand, the price level is higher than on
the baseline in the commitment solution (ﬁgure 6.4), thus a smaller surplus
is suﬃcient to ﬁnance smaller real redemption. The diﬀerence between the
two solutions again depends on the maturity structure of government debt:
the real amount of ﬁscal adjustment becomes larger when   is smaller.19
6.3 Monetary Policy in 1999–2004
6.3.1 Term-Structure of Interest Rate Gaps
As emphasized by Woodford (1999); Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe
(2003); and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a, b), history dependence is
one of the most important features of the commitment solution. To see how
history-dependent monetary policy aﬀects the output gap and inﬂation,
we rewrite the IS and AS equations (2.7) and (2.11) as
x ˆt       1(1   L 1) 1[(ı ˆt   Et  ˆt 1)   r ˆ t
n];
  ˆt       1 (1    L 1) 1(1   L 1) 1[(ı ˆt   Et  ˆt 1)   r ˆt
n].
An important thing to note is that these two variables are determined solely
by the current and future values of the interest rate gap (i.e., the spread be-
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Table 6.2 Fiscal adjustments in the discretionary and commitment solutions





t   s ˆt)
Commitment solution (A) –7.174 –6.569 –3.937 0.001
Discretionary solution (B) –5.345 –4.749 –2.581 0.035





Commitment solution (C) –11.009 –10.404 –7.771 –3.832
Discretionary solution (D) –0.465 0.132 2.300 4.916
(C) – (D) –10.544 –10.535 –10.071 –8.748
19. Put diﬀerently, this implies that keeping the maturity of government debt longer during
peacetime (i.e., on the baseline) is an eﬀective way of insuring against the risk of falling into
a liquidity trap. See Iwamura and Watanabe (2002) for more on this point.tween the actual real interest rate and its natural rate counterpart, [ı ˆt –
Et  ˆt 1] – r ˆt
n), and, in that sense, the interest rate gap is the key variable
through which monetary policy aﬀects the real side of the economy.20
Given this structure, the central bank’s commitment to continuing a zero
interest rate policy even after the natural rate of interest becomes positive
makes the private sector expect that the interest rate gap, (ı ˆt – Et  ˆt 1) – r ˆ t
n,
will shrink and become negative in the future periods, thereby weakening
the deﬂationary pressure on the current output gap and inﬂation.
More speciﬁcally, as shown in ﬁgure 6.3, the short-term real interest rate
is never below the natural rate in the discretionary solution, thus the term-




[(it k    t k 1)   rn
t k],
monotonically increases with K. In contrast, as shown in ﬁgure 6.4, the
short-term real interest rate stays below the natural rate in periods three to
six in the case of the commitment solution, and therefore the gap deﬁned
by equation (3.1) declinesduring these periods. This is a direct reﬂection of
monetary-policy inertia, and a key feature to discriminate between the two
solutions. These observations suggest a simple way to test whether the
BOJ’s actual policy is close to the optimal one: we estimate the term-
structure of interest rate gaps to see whether or not the gap declines with K
towards the end of recession.
We start by estimating the natural rate of interest using the methodology
developed by Laubach and Williams (2003).21 Equation (2.8) may be re-
written as
(3.2) rt
n    gt
p   zt,
where the potential growth rate gt
p is deﬁned as gt
p   Et(yn
t 1 – yt
n), and the
other stationary component zt is deﬁned as zt   – Et(vt 1 – vt). Following
Laubach and Williams (2003), we assume that gt
pis a random walk process,
while ztfollows an AR process. Using these two assumptions (together with
other assumptions adopted in Laubach and Williams [2003]), we estimate
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20. Admittedly, this simple relationship between the interest rate gap and x ˆt or   ˆ} t depends
on the structure of our model. However, Neiss and Nelson (2003) ﬁnd a similar relationship,
through simulation analysis, in a more complicated (and realistic) model with endogenous
capital formation, habit persistence in consumption, and price setting of the Fuhrer-Moore
type. Also, their empirical analysis using the U.K. data ﬁnds a reasonably strong negative re-
lationship between the interest rate gap and the inﬂation rate.
21. Laubach and Williams (2003) use the Kalman ﬁlter method to estimate a system of
equations consisting of the observation equations (i.e., the IS and AS equations) and the tran-
sition equations that describe the law of motion for the components of the natural rate of in-
terest. The same methodology is applied to the Japanese data by Oda and Muranga (2003).
We would like to thank Thomas Laubach and John C. Williams for providing us with the pro-
gram code used in their paper.the natural rate of interest for the period from 1982:1Q to 2003:4Q, which
is presented in panel A of ﬁgure 6.6. Note that the natural rate of interest
shown here represents the annualized overnight rate. Figure 6.6 shows that
the natural rate of interest was 7 percent in 1990, and then gradually de-
clined until it reached almost zero in 1995. Furthermore, it declined below
zero in 1998:1Q–1999:2Q, 2000:3Q–4Q, and 2001:2Q–2002:1Q, indicating
that Krugman’s (1998) prescription for the Japanese economy is not re-
jected by the data. Panels B and C of ﬁgure 6.6 decompose ﬂuctuations in
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Fig. 6.6 Estimates of the natural rate of interest: A, estimates of the natural rate
of interest; B, potential growth component; C, other (stationary) component
C
B
Athe natural rate of interest into the two components: the random walk com-
ponent ( gt
p) and the stationary component (zt). Panel B shows that the po-
tential growth rate was barely above zero in the 1990s, but fell below zero for
the three quarters starting from 2001:3Q. Negative values for the natural
rate of interest are due to very low potential growth rates, as well as adverse
temporary shocks that had occurred several times after the mid-1990s.
Figure 6.7 compares the natural rate of interest with the overnight real
interest rate, it – Et t 1. We use the uncollateralized overnight call rate for
it, and the actual inﬂation rate in period t as a proxy for the expected
overnight inﬂation rate. Figure 6.7 shows that the real call rate is signiﬁ-
cantly lower than the natural rate of interest in the latter half of the 1980s,
which is consistent with the results from the existing studies that the BOJ’s
policy was too expansionary, thereby contributing to the asset-price inﬂa-
tion during this period. It also shows that the opposite (i.e., the real call
rate is higher than the corresponding natural rate) happened in the period
from 1998 to 2002. The nominal call rate had already been lowered to the
zero lower bound during this period, but deﬂationary expectations kept the
real call rate above zero, thereby creating positive overnight interest rate
gaps in these years.
Given that the time-series estimates for the natural rate of interest are to
hand, we next construct a time series for the expected values of the natural
rate of interest EtΣK
k 0rn
t k, as well as a time series for the expected rate of
inﬂation. We construct the ﬁrst by utilizing the fact that the natural rate of
interest consists of a random walk component and a stationary compo-
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Fig. 6.7 Overnight interest rate gapnent.22 As for the expected rate of inﬂation, we use the ﬁve-year forecasts
published in The JCER Mid-term Economic Forecastsby a private research
institute, the Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER), in December
of each year. By using these two time series, we can compare the natural
rate of interest and the real interest rate for various time horizons (namely,
K in equation [3.1]).
The results of these calculations are presented in ﬁgure 6.8, which shows
the term-structure of interest rate gaps at the end of each year starting from
1998.23 First, the term structure at the end of 1998, just before the introduc-
tion of the zero interest rate policy, was upward sloping although the one-
year gap was very close to zero. The upward-sloping curve mainly comes
from the term-structure of nominal interest rates.24 These two ﬁndings sug-
gest that market participants expected that the BOJ would not adopt ex-
pansionary monetary policy suﬃcient to oﬀset an expected decline in the
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22. Speciﬁcally, zt follows an AR (1) process, which is estimated as zt   0.8304   zt 1   et.
23. The deﬁnition of the term-structure of interest rate gaps is given in equation (3.1). Note
that gaps are not annualized.
24. See Okina and Shiratsuka (2004) for the evolution of the term-structure of nominal in-
terest rates during the zero interest rate period.
Fig. 6.8 Term structure of interest rate gapsnatural rate of interest. Second, the term-structure curve at the end of 1999
shifted downward from its position in 1998, and the gaps became negative
for the time-horizon up to two years. This suggests that the BOJ’s new
regime introduced in early 1999 had successfully aﬀected the market’s ex-
pectations. More importantly, however, we see no indication of a down-
ward-sloping curve, suggesting that the BOJ’s commitment was not power-
ful enough to generate an expectation that the short-term real interest rate
would decline below the level of the natural rate counterpart. Third, the
term-structure curve at the end of 2001 was also upward sloping: to make
matters worse, it shifted up substantially from its positions in the preceding
years, indicating that quantitative monetary easing combined with a re-
newed commitment in March 2001 was not strong enough to oﬀset a pes-
simistic expectation about the future path of the natural rate of interest.25
6.3.2 Inﬂation Targeting to Implement the Commitment Solution
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a) propose a version of price-level tar-
geting to implement the optimal commitment solution characterized by
Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2003). However, as mentioned by Eggerts-
son and Woodford (2003a), price-level targeting is not the only way to im-
plement it, but a version of inﬂation targeting can also implement the com-
mitment solution. The BOJ’s commitment relates the timing to terminate
a zero interest rate policy (or quantitative-easing policy) to the rate of in-
ﬂation, so that it should be closer to inﬂation targeting rather than price-
level targeting. In this subsection, we characterize a version of inﬂation tar-
geting that achieves the commitment solution and compare it with the
BOJ’s policy commitment.
History-Dependent Inﬂation Targeting
We start by deﬁning an output-gap adjusted inﬂation measure   ˜t as
  ˜t     ˆt     1 (x ˆt   x ˆt 1),
and then denote a target for this adjusted inﬂation by  t
Tar. We also denote
the target shortfall by  t
 ( t
     t
Tar –   ˜t). Given these deﬁnitions, we sub-
stitute  1t      t
  into equation (2.29) to obtain
(3.3)  t
Tar   [1     1    (  ) 1]  
t 1     1  
t 2.
Now let us consider the following targeting rule. The inﬂation target for pe-
riod zero is set at zero ( 0
Tar  0), and the targets for the subsequent periods
are determined by equation (3.3). The central bank chooses the level of the
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25. The only example of a downward-sloping curve we observe in ﬁgure 6.8 is the year 2002
(December 2002), in which the expected one-year real interest rate in each year was close to
zero, but the corresponding natural rate was well above 2 percent, so that the interest rate gap
declines by about 2 percent per year. This might be due to imprecise estimates of the natural
rate of interest towards the end of the sample period.overnight interest rate in each period, so that it can achieve the predeter-
mined target level for the adjusted inﬂation rate. If the central bank suc-
cessfully shoots the target in each period starting from period zero, then  t
 
is always zero, therefore the target in each period never deviates from zero.
However, if the natural rate of interest falls below zero, the central bank
cannot achieve the target even if it lowers the overnight interest rate to zero.
Then,  t
  takes a positive value, and consequently the predetermined tar-
get for the next period becomes higher than zero. Given that the natural
rate of interest evolves over time following equation (2.16), the central
bank fails to achieve the targets in period zero and subsequent periods even
though it lowers the overnight interest rate to zero. Therefore the central
bank must continue a zero interest rate policy until it achieves the target in
some period, which is denoted by T   1. Since   
T 1 equals to zero by deﬁ-
nition,  1T 1must equal to zero as well, therefore T Tcmust hold. Put di-
ﬀerently, the central bank is able to implement the commitment solution by
adopting a version of inﬂation targeting in which the target inﬂation rate is
updated in each period following equation (3.3).26 It is important to note
that this inﬂation targeting has a feature of history dependence since the
current target inﬂation rate depends on the values of the natural rate of in-
terest and the performance of monetary policy in the past.
Panel A of ﬁgure 6.9 shows the evolution of the target inﬂation rate that
is needed to implement the commitment solution presented in ﬁgure 6.4.
The values for the adjusted inﬂation rate are below its target levels in the
ﬁrst six periods, but the target shortfall in each period gradually decreases
until it ﬁnally reaches zero in period six, when the central bank terminates
the zero interest rate policy.
A Comparison with the BOJ Rule
The regime of history-dependent inﬂation targeting deﬁned above has
some similarities with the BOJ’s commitment of continuing a zero interest
rate policy (or quantitative-easing policy) until some conditions regarding
the inﬂation rate are met,27 but these two rules diﬀer in some important re-
spects. To show this, we ﬁrst express the BOJ’s target criterion as
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26. Price-level targeting to implement the commitment solution can be derived in a similar
way. We deﬁne an output-gap adjusted price-level index as P ˜
t P ˜
t   –1 x ˆt, and denote the tar-
get shortfall as  t
P   Pt
Tar – P ˜
t. Then, substituting  1t      t
P into equation (2.29) leads to an
equation describing the evolution of the target price level (equation [3.11] in Eggertsson and
Woodford 2003b). See the middle panel of ﬁgure 6.9 for the path of Pt
Tar to implement the com-
mitment solution. By a similar calculation, we can characterize an instrument rule to imple-
ment the commitment solution: ı ˆt   max{0 – it ∗, it
Tar}, where it
Tar   r ˆ t
n   [1      ( 2  
 )–1]Et  ˆt 1  Etx ˆt 1–   ( 2  )–1x ˆt–1  [1    –1   (  )–1] i
t–1 –  –1 i
t–2, and  i
t it
Tar – ı ˆt. See
the lower panel of ﬁgure 6.9 for the path of it
Tar that implements the commitment solution.
27. For example, Governor Fukui emphasizes the importance of intentional policy delay
by stating that the BOJ will continue to implement monetary easing “even after the economy
has started to improve and inﬂationary expectations are emerging” (Fukui 2003).Fig. 6.9 Monetary policy rules to implement the commitment solution: 
A, inﬂation targeting; B, price-level targeting; C, instrument rule
  ˆt    ˜ Tar.
The BOJ chooses overnight call rate in each period so as to achieve this tar-
get criterion if it is possible; however, if it is not possible due to the zero in-
terest rate bound, the bank simply sets the call rate at zero.
This BOJ rule diﬀers from the regime of history-dependent inﬂation tar-
geting in the following respects. First, the output gap, x, is completely ig-
nored in the BOJ’s targeting criterion, while it plays an important role in
the targeting criterion of the history-dependent inﬂation targeting unless  
equals to zero. Put diﬀerently, under the BOJ rule, ﬂuctuations in the out-
put gap do not aﬀect the timing to terminate a zero interest rate policy (or
quantitative-easing policy). Second, the target inﬂation rate is neverrevised
under the BOJ rule, while equation (3.3) requires the central bank to revise
the target for the next period depending on whether or not it successfully
258 Mitsuru Iwamura, Takeshi Kudo, and Tsutomu Watanabe
A
A
Ashoots the target in the current period.28 In fact, despite the occurrence of
a series of unanticipated adverse events including the failures of major
banks, the target inﬂation rate has never been revised since the introduc-
tion of a zero interest rate policy in February 1999: some of the BOJ board
members repeatedly showed an adherence to the commitment made in the
past and no intention at all to revise its target level of inﬂation.29As seen in
equation (3.3), the target inﬂation rate should have been upwardly revised
in response to these additional shocks to the natural rate of interest. The
lack of history-dependent responses to unanticipated additional shocks
implies the suboptimality of the BOJ rule.
To  make a quantitative evaluation on the diﬀerence between the two
rules, we construct a time series of  t
Tar using the actual data. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that the target level for the adjusted inﬂation rate was zero just
before the introduction of a zero interest rate policy, and then compute 
 t
Tar by substituting the actual values for the inﬂation rate and the output
gap into equation (3.3). The basic idea of this exercise is as follows. If the
BOJ rule is very close to the optimal one, then we should observe that the
computed target rate is always close to    
Tar, say, 2 percent per year. On the
other hand, if the deviation of the BOJ rule from the optimal one is not neg-
ligible, then the exercise of computing target inﬂation using equation (3.3)
would be a wrong one, which could yield unrealistically large numbers for
the target rate of inﬂation.30 The result presented in ﬁgure 6.10A clearly
shows that the computed target in each period is signiﬁcantly higher than
zero, suggesting that the deviation of the BOJ rule from the optimal one
was not small.
Figure 6.10B conducts the same exercise but now we take into account
supply shocks to make the discussion closer to the reality. If deﬂation since
the late 1990s is at least partly due to supply shocks (or equivalently,
changes in relative prices), the target level of inﬂation that the BOJ seeks to
achieve should be lowered to some extent.31 To incorporate this type of ar-
gument into our model, we divide the items contained in the CPI into two
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28. Most of the discussions about the BOJ’s policy commitments have focused on whether
   
Tar is high enough to escape from the liquidity trap. However, somewhat surprisingly, little
has been said about the absence of state-contingent responses to additional shocks.
29. However, this does not necessarily mean that the BOJ did not make any response to ad-
ditional shocks. On the contrary, it responded to them by revising the target for the current
account balances very frequently: it has been revised nine times during the last three years.
However, as correctly pointed out by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a), an additional pro-
vision of liquidity to the market without any implications about the future course of mone-
tary policy has no eﬀects on the economy as long as the demand for liquidity reaches a satia-
tion level (“Irrelevance proposition”).
30. For example, if one substitutes the values of   and x obtained in the discretionary so-
lution (rather than those obtained in the commitment solution) into equation (3.3), then one
would obtain extremely large numbers for the target rate of inﬂation.
31. With respect to an appropriate policy response to supply shocks, a BOJ policy board
member stated, “It would be diﬃcult for monetary policy to control the impact of supply
shocks. If monetary policy were to try to control such impacts, it is likely that sustainable pricesubgroups, “goods” and “services,” and denote the inﬂation rate in each
sector by   ˆ1tand   ˆ2t. The inﬂation rate in each sector is not necessarily iden-
tical, thus the relative price between the two sectors could change over
time. This is the situation in which Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004) discuss
the optimal monetary policy under the assumption of sticky prices. Be-
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Fig. 6.10 Is the BOJ rule close to the optimal targeting rule?
stability would be impaired as production swings became larger and uncertainty regarding
investment increased. Therefore, we should accept change in prices due to supply shocks to a
certain extent” (Shinotsuka 2000).nigno (2004) searches for a desirable index of the inﬂation rate that a cen-
tral bank should target, and ﬁnds that it is not the traditional CPI inﬂation
rate (namely, the simple average of the two inﬂation rates) but
   ˆ1t   (1    )  ˆ2t,
where the weight   is deﬁned by
    .
Here  irepresents the probability of no price adjustments being allowed ( i
takes a larger value for more sticky prices). Note that if the core inﬂation
rate deﬁned above equals to zero, the traditional CPI inﬂation rate (n  ˆ1t  
(1 – n)  ˆ2t, where n represents the CPI weight for the goods sector) equates
to (n –  )[  ˆ1t –   ˆ2t].32 Given that the central bank responds to relative price
changes as recommended by Benigno (2004), this implies that equation
(3.3) changes to the following rule33
(3.4)  t
Tar   (n    )[  ˆ1t    ˆ2t]   [1     1    (  ) 1]  
t 1     1  
t 2.
Figure 6.10B presents the implied target inﬂation rate  t
Tar computed using
equation (3.4).34 The implied target inﬂation rate is now much closer to
zero as compared with the upper panel, but it still requires high inﬂation of
more than 2 percent per quarter. This implies that a quantitative diﬀerence
between history-dependent inﬂation targeting and the BOJ rule is not triv-
ial even if we take supply shocks into consideration.
6.4 Fiscal Policy in 1999–2004
6.4.1 Did the Japanese government follow 
a Ricardian rule in 1999–2004?
It is assumed in section 6.2 that ﬁscal policy is passive (or locally Ricar-
dian) in the sense that the government adjusts the primary surplus so that
the government’s solvency condition is satisﬁed for any path of the price
level. In this subsection, we look at the behavior of the Japanese govern-
ment to see whether or not this assumption has been satisﬁed since early
1999, when the BOJ introduced a new policy regime.
n 1(1    1) 1(1    1 ) 1
       
n 1(1    1) 1(1    1 ) 1   (1   n) 2(1    2) 1(1    2 ) 1
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32. As pointed out by Benigno (2004), the traditional CPI inﬂation rate coincides with the
core inﬂation rate if  1    2 or either of the two is equal to zero.
33. It should be noted that this rule is not derived by solving an optimization problem. 
However, Kudo, Takamura, and Watanabe (2005) explicitly solve a central bank’s loss-
minimization problem in a two-sector economy with asymmetric sectoral shocks, and obtain
an optimal monetary-policy rule that is very close to equation (3.4) in the case in which prices
are perfectly ﬂexible in one of the two sectors.
34. The values for  1 and  2 are taken from the estimates in Fuchi and Watanabe (2002): 
 1   0.389 and  2   0.853. Other parameter values are the same as before.Evidences from the Time-Series Data
A positive linkage between the primary surplus and the real value of
public debt is one of the most important implications of Ricardian ﬁscal
policy.35 Everything else equal, a fall in the price level leads to an increase
in the real value of public debt, and then the Ricardian government re-
sponds to it by increasing the primary surplus.
Figure 6.11A shows the gross public debt (relative to the nominal gross
domestic product [GDP]) on the horizontal axis against the primary sur-
plus (relative to the nominal GDP) on the vertical axis, for 1970–2003. This
ﬁgure shows that both variables tend to deteriorate simultaneously in the
1990s, indicating a negative correlation between them. However, such a
correlation may be spurious for the following reasons. First, cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations in economic activities lead to changes in the primary surplus,
mainly through changes in tax revenues. Since we are mainly interested in
the government’s discretionary responses to various shocks, we need to re-
move the changes in primary surplus due to such an automatic stabilizer.
Second, as emphasized by Barro (1986) and Bohn (1998), the government’s
tax-smoothing behavior could create a negative correlation between the
two variables. For example, think about the consequence of a temporary
increase in public expenditure. It is possible to increase taxes simulta-
neously in accordance with it, but changing marginal tax rates over time in-
creases the excess burden of taxation. Therefore, an optimizing govern-
ment minimizes the costs of taxation by smoothing marginal tax rates over
time. This implies that a temporary increase in public expenditures would
lead to a decrease in the primary surplus and an increase in the public debt.
Following Barro (1986) and Bohn (1998), we remove these two factors
by estimating a regression of the form
(4.1) SURPLUSt   a0   a1GVARt   a2YVARt   a3DEBT t 1   vt,
where SURPLUSt is the primary surplus, DEBT t–1 is the amount of the
public debt at the end of the previous period, GVARt is the level of tempo-
rary government spending measured by the deviation of the government
spending from its trend, and YVARt is the output gap measured by the 
deviation of the GDP from its trend (all relative to GDP).36 The columns
(1) and (2) of table 6.3 present the ordinary least squares estimates of this
equation for the sample period 1970–2003: the column (1) uses the gross
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35. Woodford (1998) emphasizes that a positive linkage between these two variables is a
necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for the Ricardian rule to hold, because a similar pos-
itive linkage could emerge even under the non-Ricardian ﬁscal-policy rules, through a re-
sponse of the price level to a change in the expected future primary surplus.
36. GVARt and YVARt are deﬁned by GVARt   (Gt – Gt ∗)/Y t and YVARt   (1 – Y t/Yt ∗)(Gt ∗/
Y t), where Gtis the real government spending, Y tis the real GDP, and Gt ∗and Yt ∗represent the
trend of each variable estimated by the HP ﬁlter. See Barro (1986) for more on the deﬁnition
of these two variables.public debt while the column (2) uses the net public debt.37 The coeﬃcients
on GVAR and YVAR are in the correct sign and statistically signiﬁcant in
both speciﬁcations, while the coeﬃcient of our interest, a3, is almost equal
to zero in both speciﬁcations, rejecting the Ricardian ﬁscal-policy rule. To
see why it is rejected, the lower panel of ﬁgure 6.11 plots the two variables
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Fig. 6.11 Primary surplus versus public debt, 1970–2003: A, simple correlation; 
B, adjusted correlation
37. The diﬀerence between the gross and net ﬁgures is not trivial in Japan: for example, the
debt-GDP ratio in 2003 is 1.6 for the gross debt, while 0.7 for the net debt. Broda and Wein-
stein (2004) argue that the net ﬁgure should be used to evaluate the Japanese ﬁscal situation.again, but now the primary surplus is adjusted by subtracting the business-
cycle component as well as the temporary government-spending compo-
nent (SURPLUSt – [g0   a1GVARt   a2YVARt]). As seen in the ﬁgure,
there is indeed a positive correlation between the two variables during the
period 1970–1993: the adjusted primary surplus tends to increase by about
0.10 percentage points for 1 percentage point increase in the public debt,
which is close to the corresponding U.S. ﬁgures reported in Barro (1986)
and Bohn (1998). On the other hand, during the period 1994–2003, we
observe a slightly negative correlation between the two variables even after
controlling for the business-cycle factor and temporary government
spending. The lack of a positive relationship in the latter period may be due
to low nominal interest rates during the post-bubble period, particularly
during the period of the zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing
(see equation [2.13]).
To control for ﬂuctuations in nominal interest rates in addition to the
business cycle and temporary government spending, we now estimate a re-
gression of the form
(4.2) SURPLUSt   b0   b1GVARt   b2YVARt   b3INTEREST t   vt,
where INTEREST t represents the government’s debt interest payments,
which corresponds to the expression on the right-hand side of equation
(2.13). Note that equation (4.2) can be a good approximation to equation
(4.1) as long as the interest rate is constant over time, but not so during the
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Table 6.3 Estimates of ﬁscal policy rules
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant –0.021 –0.012 –0.079 –0.052
(0.021) (0.016) (0.008) (0.005)
GVAR –1.904 –1.810 –1.640 –1.546
(0.842) (0.818) (0.311) (0.410)
YVAR –1.549 –1.256 –2.334 –2.453
(0.719) (0.649) (0.205) (0.220)
Gross public debt 0.017
(0.029)
Net public debt 0.012
(0.062)
Gross debt interest payments 2.279
(0.260)
Net debt interest payments 3.559
(0.454)
R2 0.330 0.322 0.815 0.746
σ 0.022 0.023 0.012 0.014
DW 0.237 0.243 0.515 0.363
Note: Dependent variable is the primary surplus (relative to GDP). Figures in parentheses
represent standard errors.period in which the interest rate exhibits a signiﬁcant ﬂuctuation as it did
in the latter half of the 1990s. The estimate of this equation for the same
sample period (1970–2003) is reported in the columns (3) (in which gross
debt interest payments is used) and (4) (in which netdebt interest payments
is used). The coeﬃcients on GVAR and YVAR are almost the same as be-
fore, but the coeﬃcient on the debt interest payments is now positive and
signiﬁcantly greater than unity, implying that the Ricardian rule cannot be
rejected. These sets of regression results indicate that the Japanese govern-
ment adjusted the primary surplus in response to changes in the public
debt, but only through changes in the debt interest payments.38
Given that the Japanese government behavior was, on average, consis-
tent with the Ricardian rule during 1970–2003, ﬁgure 6.12 looks more
closely at the diﬀerence between the actual and ﬁtted values for the primary
surplus, which can be interpreted as a measure for the deviation from the
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Fig. 6.12 Deviations from the Ricardian ﬁscal policy rule
38. It should be noted that these results do not necessarily imply that the Japanese ﬁscal sit-
uation is not so bad. First, according to our deﬁnition of Ricardian rule (equation [2.12]), a
government is required to generate primary surplus only to cover debt interest payments in
each period: it is not required to immediately repay the principal of debts. Given that interest
rates are very close to zero, this requirement is not so diﬃcult to fulﬁll even for a government
with a huge amount of public debts. Second, our Ricardian government is allowed to ignore
“oﬀ-balance” debts, such as public pension expenditures that are expected to rise sharply in
the near future. That is, a government is allowed to postpone ﬁscal reconstruction until oﬀ-
balance items actually change to on-balance items. Our empirical results shown in table 6.3
indicate that the Japanese government has a nice track record in the sense that it has not vio-
lated the Ricardian criterion at least so far; however, we do not have much to say about what
will happen when the central bank turns to monetary tightening, or when public pension ex-
penditures actually start to rise sometime in the future.Ricardian rule.39 There are three phases in which the residual takes signif-
icant positive values: 1970–74, 1987–92, and 1999–2002. It is not surpris-
ing to observe positive residuals in 1987–92, a period of famous episode of
ﬁscal reconstruction during which the Japanese government intensively
cut expenditures to achieve a target of “no net issuance of government
bonds.”40 But it might be somewhat surprising to observe positive residu-
als in 1999–2002, during which the Japanese economy had been in the
midst of deﬂation. This result supports the view that the Japanese govern-
ment started ﬁscal tightening just after the Obuchi Administration ended
in April 2000.41 It also suggests that policy coordination between the gov-
ernment and the BOJ did not work well during this period, in the sense that
the government deviated from the Ricardian rule toward ﬁscal tightening
while the BOJ adopted a zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing.
Evidences from the Private Sector’s Forecasts
By taking innovations of the log-linear version of equation (2.13), we ob-
tain
(Et   Et q)s ˆt   (1    ) 1(Et   Et q)ı ˆt 1
  (Et   Et q){(1      )[B ˆ
t 1   (  ) 1Q ˆ
t 1]   P ˆ
t},
which simply states that the forecast errors in the primary surplus should
be positively correlated with those in the real public debt as well as those 
in the nominal interest rate. This suggests that looking at the correlation
between the forecast errors for those variables is another way to test the
assumptions of Ricardian ﬁscal policy. Suppose that the private sector 
did not expect a change in the monetary-policy regime from discretion to
commitment,42 and that, at the end of 1998, just before the introduction of
a new monetary-policy regime, they expected the discretionary solution
would continue to be realized in the coming years. Given the analysis in
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39. Here we use the estimates in the column (3) of table 6.3; but we obtain the same result
even when we use the speciﬁcation (4) of table 6.3.
40. See Ihori, Doi, and Kondo (2001) for more on the ﬁscal reform during this period.
41. See, for example, Iio (2004). According to Iio (2004), the shift in ﬁscal-policy stance to-
ward tightening occurred during the Mori Administration (April 2000 to April 2001) and the
Koizumi Administration (April 2001 to the present). Iio (2004) argues that a change in the
electoral system from the middle-size district system to the single-member district and PR
party lists parallel system has strengthened the inﬂuence of the prime minister relative to
other political players, thereby creating a political environment for these administrations to
start ﬁscal reconstruction. See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000) for more on the re-
lationship between electoral systems and ﬁscal policymaking.
42. The BOJ had been conducting monetary policy in a discretionary manner before it
started a zero interest rate policy (see, for example, Ueda 1993). Also, Ueda (2000) empha-
sized the importance of the regime switch from discretion to commitment by stating that “the
ZIRP [zero interest rate policy] was a unique experiment in the history of the BOJ not just be-
cause the level of the overnight rate was zero but because it involved some commitment about
the future course of monetary policy.”section 6.2, this implies that the private sector should be surprised not only
by a change in monetary policy, but also by a shift in ﬁscal policy toward
more expansionary (or less tightening) in 1999 and subsequent years, be-
cause the price level should be unexpectedly higher and thus the real debt
burden should be unexpectedly lower.
Table 6.4 compares the forecasts about ﬁscal-policy variables published
in the December 1998 JCER Mid-term Economic Forecast by the JCER
with the corresponding actual values. The ﬁscal surplus, which is measured
by the net saving of the general government (relative to the nominal GDP),
was expected to deteriorate over time, starting from –0.085 in FY1999 to 
–0.117 in FY2003. But this expectation turns out to be too pessimistic: 
the corresponding actual values were –0.077 in FY1999 and –0.081 in
FY2003. These forecast errors seem to be consistent with the theoretical
prediction obtained in section 6.2. However, what is going on behind them
is quite diﬀerent from the theoretical prediction. First, the rate of deﬂation
was higher than expected: very mild deﬂation in terms of the GDP deﬂator
was expected (0.3 percent per year in 1998–2003), while the actual rate of
deﬂation turned out to be much higher (1.8 percent per year during the
same period). Second, in spite of the unexpectedly high rate of deﬂation,
the public debt, measured by the gross debt (relative to the nominal GDP)
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Table 6.4 Private sector’s forecast about ﬁscal policy
Forecast Actual






Gross debt of the general government at the beginning of each year 












Note: Forecast was published in December 1998 by the Japan Center for Economic Research
(JCER).of the general government at the beginning of each ﬁscal year, was lower
than expected. For example, the ﬁgure for FY2003 was expected to be
1.790 but turned out to be 1.619, mainly due to a slower accumulation of
nominal government debt. Third, and most importantly, the combination
of an overprediction of the public debt (i.e., an unexpectedly low govern-
ment debt) and an underprediction of the ﬁscal surplus (i.e., an unexpect-
edly small ﬁscal deﬁcit) is inconsistent with the assumption of Ricardian
ﬁscal policy. Together with the fact that the nominal interest rate was lower
than expected,43 this suggests the possibility that the Japanese government
deviated from the Ricardian ﬁscal-policy rule toward tightening.
To investigate further the unanticipated improvement in ﬁscal deﬁcits,
table 6.5shows how forecasts for the amount of public investment were up-
dated over time. The amount of public investment tends to be decided on
a discretionary basis; therefore the government’s ﬁscal-policy intention
should be more clearly seen in its changes. Table 6.5 shows that downward
revisions were consistently made for the years of FY1999, 2000, and 2001,
while no substantial revisions were made for FY2002 and 2003. This sug-
gests that an unanticipated shift in ﬁscal-policy stance toward contraction
took place around the year 2000.
6.4.2 Optimal Monetary Policy under the Assumption 
of Non-Ricardian Fiscal Policy
The above evidence suggests that the Japanese government has been de-
viating from Ricardian ﬁscal policy since the latter half of the 1990s. Given
that evidence, the next question we would like to address is whether the de-
viation from Ricardian policy has some implications for optimal mone-
tary-policy commitment. As shown by Iwamura and Watanabe (2002) in a
model with perfectly ﬂexible prices, the optimal commitment solution
diﬀers depending on whether the government follows a Ricardian or a non-
Ricardian policy. This is because the government solvency condition im-
plies an equilibrium relation between current and expected future inﬂation
under the assumption of non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy, so that the central
bank must choose between deﬂation now or deﬂation later, a tradeoﬀanal-
ogous to the “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” of Sargent and Wallace
(1981). It is important to note that, in this situation, Krugman’s (1998) pre-
scription of making a commitment to a higher price level in the future
would not work well, as emphasized by Iwamura and Watanabe (2002).
To see how the optimal monetary-policy commitment would change, let
us conduct the same exercise as we did in section 6.2.2, but now under the
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43. According to the JCER forecast in December 1998, the government-bonds yield (ten
years, benchmark) was expected to be 1.40, 1972, and 1.94 percent in 2001, 2002, and 2003,
much higher than the actual values.assumption of non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy. Since the government solvency
condition (equation [2.31]) is no longer automatically satisﬁed, we have to
consider equation (2.31) as an additional constraint for the central bank’s
loss-minimization problem. To simplify the discussion, we assume that all









   ∑
 
t 0
 t{Lt   2 1t[x ˆt   x ˆt 1     1(ı ˆt    ˆt 1   r ˆ t
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  2 2t[  ˆt    x ˆt      ˆt 1]   2 [  ˆt   (1    )s ˆt]},
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Table 6.5 Private sector’s forecast about public investment
The amount of public investment in:





1999.12 106.3 110.4 110.4
2000.03 104.6 104.6 104.4
2000.06 100.8 99.4 98.6
2000.09 100.2 99.5
2000.12 94.2 90.8 83.7
2001.03 96.8 95.0 87.3
2001.06 92.9 90.1 81.7
2001.09 88.9 83.0
2001.12 87.3 86.6 81.8
2002.03 87.9 87.5 83.3








Source: The Nomura Research Institute, various issues.
Note: Figures represent forecasts made by the Nomura Research Institute. Index, FY1997 =
100.
44. We continue to assume as before that the economy is on the baseline before period zero,
so that B–1   0.where  is a new Lagrange multiplier associated with the government’s sol-
vency condition (4.3). Denoting the optimal value of Lt by Lt ∗, the La-
grange multiplier   must satisfy45
    0.
The diﬀerence equation that characterizes the timing to terminate a zero
interest rate policy (equation [2.29]) now becomes
 1t   [1     1    (  ) 1] 1t 1     1 1t 2  
   [  ˆt     1 (x ˆt   x ˆt 1)]      ,
and its unique solution is given by
(4.4)  1t      A(L)[  ˆt     1 (x ˆt   x ˆt 1)]      A(1),
where the deﬁnition of A(L) is the same as before, and A(1) satisﬁes A(1)  
(1 –  1)–1(1 –  2)–1   0. Then, it is straightforward to see that if a zero inter-
est rate policy is terminated in the same period as in section 6.2 (namely,
period Tc),  1ttakes a positive value at t Tc 1, indicating that a zero in-
terest rate policy should be continued longer in the case of non-Ricardian
ﬁscal policy. Put diﬀerently, the property of history dependence plays a
more important role in the case when the government deviates from Ri-
cardian ﬁscal policy.
6.5 Conclusion
Have the Japanese central bank and the government adopted appropri-
ate policies to escape from the liquidity trap? To address this question, we
ﬁrst characterize optimal policy responses to a substantial decline in the
natural rate of interest, and then discuss monetary- and ﬁscal-policy rules
to implement them. Based on this analysis, we compare the optimal policy
rules with the actual policy decisions made by the Japanese central bank
and the government in 1999–2004.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, we ﬁnd that the optimal com-
mitment solution can be implemented through history-dependent inﬂa-
tion targeting in which the target inﬂation rate is revised depending on the
past performance of monetary policy. We compare this optimal rule with
the Bank of Japan’s policy commitment of continuing monetary easing un-
til some conditions regarding the inﬂation rate are satisﬁed, and ﬁnd that
∂∑
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45. As we saw in section 6.2, the Ricardian government reduces Σ 
t 0  ts ˆt in response to a
substantial decline in the natural rate of interest. The multiplier  can be interpreted as a mea-
surement of how much the government deviates from Ricardian policy.the BOJ rule lacks history dependence in the sense that the BOJ had no in-
tention of revising the target level of inﬂation in spite of the occurrence of
various additional shocks to the Japanese economy. Second, the term-
structure of the interest rate gap (i.e., the spread between the actual real in-
terest rate and its natural rate counterpart) was not downward sloping,
suggesting that the BOJ’s commitment failed to have a suﬃcient inﬂuence
on the market’s expectations about the future course of monetary policy.
Third, we ﬁnd time-series evidence that the primary surplus in 1999–2002
was higher than predicted by the historical regularity. Also, by comparing
the private sector’s forecasts with the corresponding actual values, we ﬁnd
a combination of an unexpectedly low government debt and an unexpect-
edly small ﬁscal deﬁcit. Such evidence on the government’s behavior sug-
gests that the Japanese government deviated from Ricardian ﬁscal policy
toward ﬁscal tightening. The optimal commitment solution obtained un-
der the assumption of non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy implies that, given such
government’s behavior, the central bank should continue a zero interest
rate policy longer.
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Comment Fumio Hayashi
This chapter is an extension of Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2003),
which was the ﬁrst to show policy duration,the feature about optimal mon-
etary policy requiring the central bank to continue the zero interest rate
policy well after the natural interest rate becomes positive. The value-
added of this chapter consists of: (a) showing that the optimal monetary
policy can be expressed as a version of inﬂation targeting, (b) testing
whether policy duration can be found in the Japanese data, (c) a discussion
of whether the recent Japanese ﬁscal policy is “Ricardian,” and (d) a deri-
vation of optimal monetary policy when ﬁscal policy is not “Ricardian.”
Perhaps because of its desire to cover these various issues, in sharp con-
trast to its predecessor, the chapter is loaded with exceedingly complex no-
tation and numerous equations (many of which are redundant). The reader
not familiar with the literature may ﬁnd it hard to read this chapter. My dis-
cussion will be mainly concerned with an exposition of a stripped-down
version of the chapter’s model and an examination of its analytical aspects.
My comments on the chapter will appear at the end.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Liquidity Trap 273
Fumio Hayashi is a professor of economics at the University of Tokyo, and a research as-
sociate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.A Simpliﬁed Model
Most readers should now be familiar with the “New Keynsian sticky-
price model” made popular by Woodford’s book (2003). Its deterministic
version consists of two equations:
IS equation: xt   xt 1     1(it    t 1   rt
n),
AS equation:  t    xt      t 1,
where xtis the output gap (the log diﬀerence between actual output and the
natural output level), it is the nominal interest rate between date t and date
t   1,  t 1 is the inﬂation rate between dates t and t   1, and rt
n is the natu-
ral real interest rate. In the stochastic version, the variables dated t   1 on
the right-hand sides of the IS and AS equations would be expected values
(so, for example, xt 1 would be replaced by Et[xt 1]). Having actual values
in place of expectations amounts to assuming perfect foresight. The cen-
tral bank’s objective is to ﬁnd the best inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ by mini-




 t   t
2    xt
2 .
The IS and AS equations here diﬀer from the chapter’s counterparts,
equations (2.7) and (2.11), in two respects. First, there is no uncertainty
here, but this is actually useful, given that virtually all the results of the
chapter (including the numerical solution) are for the deterministic case.
Second, as in the standard exposition of the New Keysian model and un-
like in the chapter, there are no hats over the variables here. The chapter
employs the complex notation with hats, probably because of its desire to
linearize the government budget constraint around a baseline path for the
nominal interest rate. As I argue below, however, such a linearization is
harmful as well as unnecessary.
In minimizing the loss function, the central bank picks the sequence of
the nominal rate {it} 
t 0, taking the sequence of the natural interest rate
{rt
n} 
t 0 as given. The two-equation system consisting of the IS and AS
equations can be viewed as a bivariate ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation in ( t,
xt) with it – rt
n as the forcing variable. The system can be written as
              .
It is easy to show that the 2   2 coeﬃcient matrix has two real eigenvalues,
one between zero and one and the other greater than one. Therefore, even
if the sequence {it – rt
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gather that the convention of the literature is to assume that the central
bank can select a particular solution from among the continuum of solu-
tions. Under this convention, the central bank’s problem is to choose a se-
quence {it,  t, xt} 
t 0 to minimize the loss function subject to the IS and AS
equations for t   0, 1, 2, ....  
The Commitment Solution without the Zero Bound
The chapter is mainly concerned about the “commitment” solution in
which the central bank adheres to the path of the nominal rate chosen in
date zero. Since it enters the IS equation only, this minimization problem
can be done in two stages, as shown in chapter seven of Woodford (2003).
In the ﬁrst stage, minimize the loss function with respect to sequences { t,
xt} subject only to the AS equation. In the second stage, given the sequence
{ t, xt} so determined, use the IS equation to back out the interest rate.
Although this two-stage procedure is useful for clarifying the structure
of the minimization problem, it will turn out to be useful, when we later in-
troduce the zero interest rate bound, to incorporate both the IS and AS
equations simultaneously. So, form the Lagrangian as
   ∑
 
t 0
 t   t
2    xt
2    1t[xt   xt 1     1(it    t 1   rt
n)] 
   2t( t    xt      t 1) .
The ﬁrst-order conditions (still with the nonnegativity constraint on the
nominal rate ignored) with respect to itis ∂ /∂it 0 (t 0, 1, 2, . . .), which
implies  1t   0 for all t   0. The rest of the ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂ /∂ 0   0, ∂ /∂ t   0 (t   1), ∂ /∂x0   0, and ∂ /∂xt   0 (t   1). These
latter conditions can be written as
(6C.1)  0    2,0   0,
(6C.2)  t    1t    2t    2,t 1   0, t   1,
(6C.3)  x0    10      2,0   0,
(6C.4)  xt    1t    1,t 1      2t   0, t   1.
(Equations [6C.2] and [6C.4] are equations [2.24] and [2.25] of the chapter
without hats.)
Setting  1t   0 in these four equations, substituting (6C.4) into (6C.2) to
eliminate { 2t}, and combining the resulting equation with the AS equa-
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The 2   2 coeﬃcient matrix has two real eigenvalues, one of them between
zero and one and the other greater than one. So there appears to be a con-
tinuum of bounded solutions, but equations (6C.1) and (6C.3), which with
 10   0 can be combined to yield  x0      0   0, provides an initial condi-
tion that pins down the unique bounded solution. It is easy to show that
that unique solution is  t   0, xt   0 for all t   0. The associated shadow
prices are also zero:  1t 0,  2t 0 for all t 0. Thus, the central bank can
achieve the ﬁrst-best under commitment. (As shown in, e.g., chapter seven
of Woodford [2003], the ﬁrst-best can be achieved under discretion as well.)
Unlike the proof by Woodford and others, my proof of the ﬁrst-best here
does not depend on the boundedness of the shadow price { 2t}. As equa-
tion (6C.2) with  1t   0 shows, it is possible that { 2t} is unbounded while
{ t} is bounded.
The Commitment Solution with the Zero Bound
Now I consider the commitment solution with the nonnegativity con-
straint it   0. Noting that it can be calculated from the IS equation as it  
 t 1   rt
n    (xt 1 – xt), the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to it is now:
(6C.6)  1t   0,
(6C.7)  t 1   rt
n    (xt 1   xt)   0,
(6C.8) [ t 1   rt
n    (xt 1   xt)] 1t   0.
If the natural real interest rate rt
nis nonnegative, then the ﬁrst-best solution
( t   xt    1t    2t   0 for all t   0) also satisﬁes equations (6C.6)–(6C.8).
so even with the zero bound the ﬁrst-best is the solution. The zero bound
becomes relevant only when rt
n   0 for some t.
Suppose, then, that rt
n is initially negative but becomes positive after
some date. The particular path for rt
n is assumed by the chapter is
(6C.9) rt
n   rn
     tεn
0, t   0, 1, 2, . . . , εn
0   0, rn
    0.
For this path, it seems reasonable to assume that the zero bound is bind-
ing continuously for the ﬁrst several periods and never binds thereafter.
That is,
(6C.10)  1t 0 for t 0, 1, . . . , Tcand  1t 0 for t Tc 1, Tc 2, ....  
Under this assumption, Jung-Teranishi-Watanabe (2003) and this chapter
provide a set of equations that determine the whole time paths of (it,  t, xt,
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n becomes positive (that is, the sign change for rt
n occurs before
Tc). They also show that, in contrast to this commitment solution, the zero
bound ceases to bind as soon as rt
n becomes positive under discretion. I
have no alternative proof here. I only point out that the reader would have
liked to see the assumption (6C.10), although intuitively plausible, veriﬁed.
Other Comments
So far we have been concerned about the choice made by the central
bank. Under either commitment or discretion, the central bank picks a
path {it,  t, xt} 
t 0. Recalling that  t is the inﬂation rate between date t – 1
and t and noting that the price level in date –1, P –1, is given, picking a se-
quence {it,  t} 
t 0 amounts to picking a sequence of the price level and the
real interest rate, {P t, r t} 
t 0. If the sequence under commitment is indicated
by superscript “c” and the one under discretion by superscript “d”, the
chapter shows that, for the natural real rate sequence considered above,
Pt
c   Pt
d, rt
c   rt
d, t   0, 1, 2, ....  
In the “Ricardian” regime, the ﬁscal authority takes the sequence {P t,
r t} 
t 0 picked by the central bank, either under commitment or discretion,
as given and adjusts the real primary surplus sequence {st} 
t 0 so that the





is satisﬁed. Here, we are assuming that the government issues only one-
period bonds and B–1is the nominal government bonds outstanding at date
–1. Toward the end of section 6.2.2 of the chapter, it is claimed that ﬁscal
policy should be more expansionary under commitment. That is, if {st
c}
and {st
d} are the sequences of real primary surplus chosen by the ﬁscal au-











(This is the deterministic version of the chapter’s equation [2.32].) This
does not seem to hold, even when the initial debt B–1 is set equal to zero.
Here is a counterexample. Consider special sequences with s0   1 and s2  
s3   ...     0. With B–1   0, we have
1    0   1   .
So sc
1   –(1   rc
0) and sd
1   –(1   rd
0). Since rc
0   rd
0 as noted above, we have
sc
1   sd








1   rc
0
B 1  
P0
st     
(1   r0)(1   r1) . . . (1   r t 1)
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questions.
• In section 6.3, the authors note that, for the numerical solution fea-
turing the assumed path of rt
n as described in equation (9) it –  t 1 – rt
n
is negative for some t. They then go on to test whether or not this neg-
ative component is reﬂected in the term-structure of interest rates at
various calendar dates for date zero, based on their estimate of rt
n.
However, their estimate of rt
n, shown in ﬁgure 6.6, does not resemble
the path assumed in the numerical solution. If the assumed path were
as shown in ﬁgure 6.6, then it –  t 1 – rt
n might not be negative for some
t. As another criticism, a more robust implication of policy duration
(that it remains zero even after rt
n becomes positive) is about it – rt
n.
• Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show in a similar model (but with rt
n
following a Markov process) that the commitment solution can be im-
plemented by either inﬂation targeting or price-level targeting, with
the target moving continuously to reﬂect the target shortfall. The
chapter shows the same for the chapter’s deterministic model (the
chapter discusses only inﬂation targeting, but during the conference it
was agreed that price-level targeting also works). Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) also argue that a price-level targeting that does not
depend on the target shortfall nearly implements the commitment so-
lution. Is the same true for the chapter’s model?
• As the chapter’s derivation of the new Keynesian model in section 6.2
aptly shows, ﬁscal policy is very neutral. First, because of Ricardian
equivalence, the timing of taxes given a sequence of government ex-
penditure gt does not matter. Second, gt in the model is like a school
lunch program, being perfectly substitutable with private consump-
tion. So the path {gt} has no eﬀect, which explains why gt does not
show up in the IS equation. However, at least for the “Ricardian” case,
the analysis of monetary policy under commitment and discretion
would not be aﬀected if gt showed up in the IS equation. All one needs
to do is to redeﬁne rt
n to reﬂect the eﬀect of gt.
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